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ABSTRACT: In contrast to national historical approaches, global history responds to the cultural and
intellectual needs of communities, societies and cultures which are increasingly interconnected. Global history
is an appropriate way of looking to ‘‘our past’’, in an era of accelerated globalization, helping to ‘‘de-
provincialize’’ the discipline. For historians of Europe, global history approaches offer a useful ground for
embedding, relativizing and enriching their views and perspectives, even when they continue to work as
historians of Europe and do not contemplate to become global historians.
As many examples show, global history is emerging as a field in which new forms of cooperation between
history and the neighbouring disciplines, particularly the social sciences, can be practiced in new ways. Global
history revives the interest in comprehensive structures and large-scale processes; it enhances the analytical power
ofhistoryasadiscipline. Italso raises severalproblemswhicharenotyet resolved.Verydifferent typesofdiscourses
and studies are usually lumped together under the heading of ‘‘global history’’, four of them are here considered.
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RESUMEN: Historia global: oportunidades, peligros, tendencias recientes.- En contraste con los enfoques de la
historia nacional, la historia global responde a las necesidades culturales e intelectuales de comunidades,
sociedades y culturas que esta´n interconectadas de forma creciente. La historia global es una forma apropiada
de mirar ‘‘nuestro pasado’’ en una era de acelerada globalizacio´n, ayudando a ‘‘des-provincializar’’ la
disciplina. Para los historiadores de Europa, los enfoques de la historia global ofrecen una u´til base para alojar,
relativizar y enriquecer sus puntos de vista y perspectivas, incluso si continu´an trabajando como historiadores
de Europa y no quieren convertirse en historiadores globales propiamente dichos.
Como muchos ejemplos muestran, la historia global esta´ emergiendo como un campo en el que nuevas
formas de cooperacio´n entre la historia y las disciplinas vecinas, particularmente las ciencias sociales, pueden ser
probadas y practicadas en nuevos modos. La historia global revive el intere´s en estructuras comprensivas y
procesos a gran escala, y mejora el poder analı´tico de la historia como disciplina. Generalmente, bajo el tı´tulo de
‘‘historia global’’ se incluyen estudios y tipos de discurso muy diferentes; aquı´ se consideran cuatro de ellos.
PALABRAS CLAVE: historia global; historiografı´a; investigacio´n histo´rica; nuevas tendencias historiogra´ﬁcas.
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ONE
In the way they talk about history, historians are
influenced by their specific experience, regional
and cultural background, professional profile and
expertise. Although my work has transnational
dimensions with much interest for large-scale
comparison, I am basically a historian of Europe
with emphasis on Germany and the modern period.
Please keep this in mind while you consider my
comments on global history.
TWO
History as a scholarly discipline was never
restricted to the national level. Local and regional
history have always been strong. Historians have
traditionally studied ideas, religion, commerce and
many other areas of transnational or transregional
scope. There are important traditions of world
history in several parts of the world, dating back
to Herodot and Polybios, Sima Quian or Ibn
Khaldun. Or think of Otto Hintze, Fernand
Braudel and Eric Hobsbawm, famous historians
of the 20th century who produced remarkable
works with a transnational approach.
Still, ever since the early 19th century, when
history began to emerge (in Europe) as a specia-
lized, professionalized discipline, national historical
approaches moved to the foreground. The rise of
history as a professional discipline in the univer-
sities, schools and public space was part of cultural
nation-building. The rise of history as a mass
discipline was supported by the emerging or
self-empowering nation states, while historians
interpreted the relationship between the past, the
present and the future in ways conducive to the
formation and affirmation of national identities.
The methodological principles of the profession,
which became standardized and powerful in the
same period of time, predisposed historians for this
national function: Historians learned to base their
studies on primary sources, especially in archives
organized by the states; they privileged texts over
other sources, which made the knowledge of
language indispensable and limited the reach of
historical research; they were obliged to take
contexts serious and study them closely; they were
trained to aim at time-specific and space-specific
descriptions, explanations and interpretations, and
not for the type of broad generalizations favoured
by the natural scientists and some in the slowly
rising social sciences.
In this formative period  the 19th century for
the West  the public functions and the methodo-
logical characteristics of history as a discipline
re-enforced each other and prepared the way for
the relative dominance of national-historical
approaches.
This did not necessarily mean that historians
were nationalists (though many of them were). Nor
did it mean that all historians wrote comprehensive
histories of the countries in which they lived
(most historians did not, but concentrated on
more specific topics). But it meant that the intellec-
tual maps which historians used for placing and
framing their topics were increasingly structured by
differences between national cultures and borders
between nation states. It also meant that most
historians focused on and regarded themselves as
competent in specific national histories (and
not others), frequently (but not necessarily) the
national historical contexts of their own countries.
This was particularly true for those historians who
played roles as public intellectuals since the
textbooks which they could try to influence, and
the debates in which they engaged, were primarily
informed by national-cultural contexts defined by
language, shared communication, common beliefs
and national institutions.
Of course, the world has changed much since the
19th century. Nationalism has led to catastrophe,
historians have become less nationalistic, history
was thoroughly diversified; comparative, micro,
regional, ethnic, analytical approaches have gained
ground. The old alliance between history as a
discipline and the nation state has been loosened.
On the other hand, much has survived of the
classical historical paradigm, both in the methods
and the public functions of historians, spreading
throughout the world, changing on the way and
becoming highly varied, but still with impressive
continuity. As a consequence  due to good and
bad reasons , national historical views and
approaches continue to weigh heavily in our
profession, and in some parts of the world they
are even dominant.
THREE
This is, I believe, the background that has made
global history so attractive since the late 1980s and
early 1990s, when the concept ‘‘global history’’
started to be used, when global or world historical
journals and associations were founded, and when
a lively programmatic debate was brought on the
way slowly followed by substantial research and
empirical literature with a global-historical reach.
Very different types of discourses and studies are
usually lumped together under the heading of
‘‘global history’’. Let me distinguish four of them,
following Conrad et al. (2007).
First, there is a new interest in the history of the
world economy, moving beyond the old ‘‘world
system approach’’ as practiced by Immanuel
Wallerstein in the 1970s and 80s. The debate about
the ‘‘Great Divergence’’ is perhaps the best known
example. It deals with the question of whether and
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why the economic developments of China’s
Yangtse Delta region and North Western Europe
were roughly similar over the centuries (with
perhaps a small Chinese lead), while the Industrial
Revolution dramatically changed the relation be-
tween both regions since the 18th century, with
England and other parts of Europe taking off and
China stagnating. Pomeranz (2000) tried to give an
answer. According to him, the emerging gap was
owed less to internal developments of the English
economy, but more to external conditions. ‘‘Forces
outside the market and conjunctures beyond
Europe deserve a central place in explaining why
Western Europe’s otherwise largely unexceptional
core achieved unique breakthroughs and wound up
as the privileged centre of the 19th century’s new
world economy.’’
Second, historical analyses of civilizations have
experienced a remarkable come-back, more than a
hundred years after Buckle, Danilevsky and
Toynbee. Here historically minded social scientists
play a role, but so do historians. I am thinking of
Samuel Huntington’s ‘‘Clash of Civilizations’’, but
even more so of Shmuel Eisenstadt’s theory of
‘‘multiple modernities’’ which can be seen as an
alternative both to Huntington and to classical
modernization theory in that it explicitly empha-
sizes the equal rights of different historical devel-
opments in different regions of the world, rejecting
the idea of Europe or the West as being a superior
model to which all other experiences are compared.
There is much controversial debate about the
‘‘multiple modernities’’ approach, but historians
have picked up its concepts and its spirit, e.g. Tu
Wei-ming in his studies about Confucianism and a
particular Chinese way into modernity. This dis-
cussion about modernities instead of modernization
invites broad comparisons, but even more so the
search for interaction between different civilizations
and different religions. This way the units of
analysis  civilizations  are handled as units with
perforated, fluid borders and as parts of a larger
whole (which, in itself, is not really theorized). The
search for interaction and exchanges has become
central for this and many other types of global
history.
Third, I want to mention the history of globa-
lization, not in the sense of increasing convergence,
but of increasing interdependence, intensified
mutual perceptions, interactions and exchanges
between different parts of the world, on different
levels of analysis: with respect to economic integra-
tion, empires and nations and their relations to one
another (including war and violence), cultural
change between convergence and differentiation,
interrelated perceptions of time and space, trans-
port and communication, patterns of migration.
It is useful to distinguish between globalization as a
process and globalization as a perspective.
Globalization as a process has a long history,
according to some with roots in antiquity, accord-
ing to others since the early 16th century when
colonialism began and Europe began to dominate
commerce across continents. Historians like
Anthony Hopkins and C. A. Baily have distin-
guished different phases of accelerated globaliza-
tion, among them the late 18th century, the decades
before World War I and the most recent phase of
accelerated globalization from the 1980s up to the
present time. Clearly, these protracted, non-linear
processes, unequally distributed over space and
between historical dimensions, subject to interrup-
tions and even reversals, offer much to be studied,
not only by modern historians but also by histor-
ians of older periods. Globalization as a perspective
is younger, and while it is difficult to exactly
determine when it started, it can be said that it
did not become influential and widespread among
historians before the late 1980s or early 1990s.
Fourthly, postcolonial approaches must be men-
tioned, as they were also particularly influential
since the 1980s. Here the impact of historians and
intellectuals from non-Western parts of the world 
from India, from Egypt, later from East Asia, too 
has been important. The emphasis was and still is
on the asymmetric relations between the colonizers
from the West and the colonized in the non-
Western world, frequently placing particular em-
phasis on cultural dimensions. But attention was
not only (and not primarily) directed to the impact
that the metropolis had on the dependent periph-
ery. Rather, attention was redirected to the influ-
ence that the periphery had on the centre, India on
Britain, parts of the ‘‘Orient’’ on parts of the West.
Said’s ‘‘Orientalism’’ had a deep impact, so had the
‘‘Subaltern’’ school of Indian historians  in both
cases we see intellectuals with origins outside the
West, but deeply immersed in the critical discourses
within Western centres of academic life.
The impact of postcolonial thought and
politics has strengthened and cultivated the anti-
Eurocentric thrust so strong in many writings of
global history in the last two decades. Pointing out
that Europe and the West were not just acting
subjects of history, but receiving and dependent
objects of constellations and processes involving the
non-Western world, deconstructing European and
Western feelings of superiority so strong in
earlier decades and centuries, demonstrating that
European and Western leads and advantages were
not (or not only) internally created, but
partly externally produced, namely by asymmetric
interactions and relations of inequality and
power, ‘‘provincializing’’ Europe and the West
(Chakrabarty, 2000) or ‘‘Re-Orienting’’ global
history (to borrow from Frank, 1998)  this
became a widespread inclination and passion that
continues to motivate many adherents of global
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history, particularly in Western countries. But not
all global historians engage in ‘‘Europe-bashing’’
and the deconstruction of ‘‘the West’’.
FOUR
The meaning of ‘‘global history’’ varies to a
certain extent. In contrast to most forms of
‘‘universal history’’ (much stronger in previous
decades and centuries), global history today is not
teleological. By contrast with some types of ‘‘world
history’’ one should emphasize that ‘‘global his-
tory’’ is not only defined by its global reach, but
also by its emphasis of interactions, exchanges and
interrelations across the boundaries between na-
tional states, regions, continents and cultures.
Maybe one should add a third criterion in order
to grasp the core of present-day global history. It is
its notion of difference. What most global histor-
ians try to avoid is to understand observable
differences between nations, cultures, regions
and civilizations in a temporal way, i.e. in terms
of ‘‘not yet’’ and ‘‘already’’, as indicators of
advancement and backwardness on a way towards
global convergence according to models offered
by the West. Instead of expecting a universal
trend towards more convergence and homogeniza-
tion, global historians are not surprised to detect
that increasing interaction may produce new differ-
ences, e.g. in the cultural field. This way they
distinguish themselves from earlier modernization
theory both inside and outside the Marxist tradi-
tion.
But the borderlines are not absolutely clear.
Take ‘‘The Rise of the West’’ (McNeill, 1963), that
is frequently seen as one of the pioneering works in
global history. Or take ‘‘The Wealth and Poverty of
Nations’’ (Landes, 1998) as one of the most widely
read books on global economic and social history.
Both authors write from a perspective that
acknowledges European or Western ‘‘comparative
advantages’’ and role models, vividly rejected by
others. The field of global history is highly
diversified in itself, and it has grown tremendously
over the last two decades.
Why? Global history started to take off in the
U.S. in the late 1980s, fuelled by demands from the
side of high school and college teaching curricula.
Given the increasing importance of immigration
from different regions of the world and the impact
of identity politics of ethnic minorities, the tradi-
tional surveys covering ‘‘Western Civilization’’
were criticized and sometimes replaced by World
History or Global History courses. The end of the
Cold War stimulated thinking in terms of world-
wide interactions and interrelations instead of East-
West comparisons. Most important I think has
been globalization as a process which accelerated
and intensified in the 1980s/90s with the digital
revolution, the end of the East-West divide, the fast
expansion of capitalism and changes in traffic
patterns and communication. These trends were,
on the intellectual level, paralleled, reflected and
articulated by the spread of network thinking and
theories, emphasizing interaction, reciprocity
and feedback instead of causes, consequences and
unilinearity. These concepts, imaginations and
rhetoric squared well with boundary crossing,
entanglements, open structures and ambivalence
so dear to modern global history thought.
FIVE
Not everybody is a convinced believer in the
virtues of global history. Objections have been
raised. Indeed, one should see the problems in-
herent to such approaches. Three of them will be
mentioned:
(1) Historians are used to investigate very closely
the materials and problems they study. They
take the specific contexts of their objects very
seriously. They prefer to read source materi-
als in the languages in which they were
produced. They are trained to arrive at
statements  descriptions, explanations, inter-
pretations  that are period and site-specific.
These are the standards of the profession.
Relative to them it can be risky to write about
phenomena of global scope. There is the
danger of superficiality. What must be
avoided is global history as ‘‘history light’’
which would lend itself easily to ideologiza-
tion. But as successful examples and many
experiences prove, this danger can be
avoided: by modesty in the formulation of
the aims, by a high degree of self-critical
reflexivity on the side of the practitioners, and
by knowledge, erudition, skill and a sense of
proportion which are signs of maturity in a
scholar. Global history belongs to the most
difficult tasks historians can shoulder. It is
not for beginners.
(2) It is easy to overrate interactions and rela-
tions as explanatory factors. In order to
explain basic economic, cultural, social and
political changes, it is also necessary to study
problems and solutions, tensions, conflicts
and developments inside economies, societies,
cultures and political entities, the importance
of their relations to other economies, socie-
ties, cultures and political units not-
withstanding. This is the most basic reason
why global historians should not neglect
comparisons, this means, they should not
neglect asking for similarities and differences
and using them for explanation and inter-
pretation. Whenever global historians limit
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their work on the reconstruction of interac-
tions, interrelations and entanglements only,
they run the danger of over-simplification, or
they shy away from the task of explanation.
(3) Most works in global history are done in the
U.S., in some countries of Europe (especially
Great Britain), and now increasingly also in
Eastern Asia. One should not forget that even
the most encompassing study of global phe-
nomena is based on viewpoints and concepts
influenced by the regional, cultural and
intellectual context of which the author is
part. This is why it is indispensable to have
global historical interpretations from differ-
ent regional and cultural contexts that have to
take notice of and compete with one another.
Internal pluralism is a necessary condition of
success within global history. Otherwise new
forms of asymmetric relations and imbalances
are likely to emerge, within the interpretation
of global history.
But, when assessing problems of global history
today, it should be remembered that global history
is a minority phenomenon. It is safe to predict that
it will remain a minority phenomenon for a long
time to come. There is no danger at all that global
history will push aside or crowd out national
history and other forms of historical study that
fulfil cultural, social and political needs not served
by global history, and that are frequently less
demanding and more popular than global history.
Global history is a highly demanding and basically
critical supplement to the main body of historical
research and writing, which nearly everywhere
continues to be strongly structured around national
historical paradigms and other non-global views. It
can help to modify and refine national historical
approaches without making them obsolete.
Given this situation, not the problems but the
opportunities of global history weigh heavily. They
should be emphasized in conclusion.
In contrast to national historical approaches,
global history responds to the cultural and intellec-
tual needs of communities, societies and cultures
that are increasingly interconnected. Global history
is an appropriate way of looking to ‘‘our past’’ in
an era of accelerated globalization.
Some kind of ethnocentrism, nationalism and
cultural self-referentiality colours the work of many
historians in many parts of the world. Global
history can be useful as an antidote. It can question
and relativize such intellectual and cultural self-
limitations that are so powerful in our discipline.
Global history can help to ‘‘de-provincialize’’ the
discipline. There is a basic affinity between the
potential of global history and the aims of
ICHS - the International Committee of Historical
Sciences - when trying to organize the world
community of historians in the 20th and 21st
centuries. For historians of Europe  particularly
when they come from European countries  global
history approaches offer a useful ground for
embedding, relativizing and enriching their views
and perspectives even when they continue to work
as historians of Europe and do not want to become
global historians.
As many examples show, global history is
emerging as a field where new forms of cooperation
between history and the neighbouring disciplines,
particularly the social sciences, can be tried out and
practiced in new ways. Global history revives the
interest in comprehensive structures and large-scale
processes that historians with micro-historical or
cultural-historical preferences have frequently ne-
glected in recent decades. Global history makes it
necessary to take large and comprehensive contexts
(Zusammenha¨nge) seriously and offers approaches
to study them. This way it enhances the analytical
power of history as a discipline.
I want to close with a sense of modesty. In some
cases global historians write encompassing, inte-
grated and balanced histories of the world during a
specific period. Take the books on the 19th century
by C. A. Bayly (2004) and J. Osterhammel (2009) as
outstanding examples. More frequent is the global
historical discussion of a specific problem like the
‘‘Great Divergence’’ between China and Western
Europe or the history of work (e. g. by Marcel van
der Linden, 2008). Studies of this kind combine
topical focus with global scope. Even more frequent
are studies on specific topics in a specific country or
region, studies that embed their topic in a global
historical context by seeing it as part of global
developments. Frequently they succeed in develop-
ing new perspectives on topics and problems that
would look different if they were situated exclu-
sively in a national historical framework. Sebastian
Conrad’s study on nation, nationalism and work in
the German Empire (Conrad, 2006) makes use of
such an approach.
In other words, global history appears in very
different forms. Sometimes it is the empirical core,
the major content of a full-fledged and encompass-
ing presentation. Sometimes it is the medium in
which certain historical problems are analyzed.
Sometimes it is just a perspective that informs,
e.g. a study of primarily national historical content.
One does not have to become a global historian in
order to profit from global history.
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